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Over recent years, the debate on brownfield land has intensified. There has been increasing 
recognition of the crucial role of land ownership in strategies and programmes designed to achieve 
urban regeneration. It has become apparent that the implementation of redevelopment projects 
depends very much on successful land assembly including the acquisition of lesser ownership 
interests. Both costs and delays in concluding this crucial phase in the development process can harm 
the feasibility of redevelopment projects and prevent the realisation of redevelopment opportunities. 
 
This chapter examines brownfield ownership interests in selected cities of the United Kingdom within 
the context of "growth coalition theory" as developed from the United States. The growth coalition 
approach regards ownership interests as dominant forces in local economic growth. The chapter thus 
concentrates on the characteristics, attitudes and networks of owners of brownfield land in the UK, 
exploring their contribution to local property development and economic growth. The rationale for 
investigating land ownership interests is that it improves understanding of the operations of land and 
property markets in relation to matters of wider economic importance. 
 
The chapter is based on research on ownership interests in 20 potential redevelopment sites in 
each of four selected cities in the United Kingdom. The results establish clear patterns of owner 
characteristics and relationships with other property-related interests. These findings have 
important repercussions for the application of the concept of growth coalitions in the United 
Kingdom and have wider significance regarding the strategies and mechanisms appropriate to the 
redevelopment of land and the regeneration of localities. 
 
LANDOWNERS, GROWTH COALITION AND URBAN NETWORKS 
 
Landowners do not represent a homogenous category of property interests. The plethora of 
approaches to land ownership bears testimony to the range of attempts to reveal the significance 
of such interests in both the property development process and local economic development. In 
addition to conferring economic and political power, land ownership shapes many aspects of urban 
development. Kivell (1993), for example, contends that the principles and supposed effects of 
ownership are hotly debated from time to time but empirical evidence is thin. 
 
Adams and May (1991) attempt a classification of landowners based on their contributions in seeking 
to promote the development of their land. While "active" landowners take action that leads ultimately 
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to the development of their land, "passive" landowners hold on to their land without development. 
More recent research has revealed a range of ownership constraints to redevelopment (Adams et al., 
1999). Some of the constraints identified are clearly the hallmarks of passive ownership interests. In 
its vision of an urban renaissance, the Urban Task Force (1999, p. 250) recognised the harm such 
ownership impediments can cause to redevelopment potential, and recommended that compulsory 
purchase legislation be consolidated and streamlined. In the subsequent Urban White Paper for 
England (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 2000), the Government 
accepted this recommendation and promised the necessary legislation as soon as Parliamentary time 
allowed. 
 
Since land ownership is regarded as pivotal to local economic development and growth, the 
strategies and actions of land demand investigation. The focus on ownership interests as the 
engines for both the initiation and promotion of local economic growth is embraced in the concept 
of "growth coalitions". The growth coalition model has been developed within the American 
context of economic growth as the essence of virtually any given locality (Molotch, 1976). Despite 
its distinctive American origin and flavour, the concept shows relevance to situations in the United 
Kingdom where it has spurred research interest, particularly in urban regeneration and local 
economic growth (Harding, 1991; Lloyd and Newlands, 1990). 
 
The fundamental proposition of the concept of growth coalition is that the political and economic 
forces in any one locality co-operate to promote local economic growth (Molotch, 1976). The "growth 
imperative" is the focal issue upon which local forces of different political flavour and diverse social 
interest are mobilised and achieve consensus. It is this unity of purpose that knits together various 
private and public sector interests and strategies. The growth coalition, therefore, represents an 
alliance of such interests whose common agenda is the achievement of local economic growth. 
However, it is precisely the need to achieve growth that constrains the range of feasible options for 
local social and economic reform. 
 
The growth coalition approach emphasises the importance of property-based interests, in particular 
land ownership, in the promotion of economic growth. Unlike other forms of capital, land is 
immovable. Ownership interests are place-bound since they relate to specific sites within certain 
locations. They derive profits from an intensification of the use of their land and buildings. Growth 
coalition theory therefore suggests that these interests coalesce and remain at the forefront of 
strategies designed to achieve economic growth, the benefits of which accrue to coalition members. 
Other forms of capital are relatively mobile, making transfer by owners possible from region to region, 
depending of course, on their assessments of the strength of development opportunities.   
 
However, there are other interests, besides ownership, that are related to property directly or 
indirectly. These include organisations that derive benefit from construction and servicing of property. 
Additional interests include those concerned with regulations regarding property ownership and 
development, and a much wider variety of organisations that derive benefits from local economic 
development. In growth coalition theory, ownership interests in any one locality are deemed to be 
consciously working to achieve growth even in competition with others in different locations. The 
place-bound interests attempt to attract mobile forms of capital from both the private and public 
sectors through the establishment of stable networks and political alliances. 
 
Landowners are often at the core of the alliance of interests that constitute the growth coalition and 
whose purpose is to promote local economic growth. They can, therefore, be expected to have 
established an array of formal and informal relationships and contacts with the objective of enhancing 
their interests through local economic growth. Such contacts would seek to redevelop the properties 




and in some cases are constituted through fluid relationships that may be hard to prove (Lowndes, et 
al., 1997). Networks are dynamic due to the changing intensity and nature of individuals' relationships 
with other members within the network. 
 
The importance of networking by any one ownership interest reflects the weight of property 
development and management within the organisation's strategy. Organisations whose interests in 
property are incidental to some primary interest are less inclined to take the initiative in the 
development of their properties unless there are reasons compelling them to do so. On the other 
hand, organisations that have property development interests that are central to their business can be 
expected to be actively seeking to redevelop their properties. 
 
In addition, the pressure to develop a particular piece of land derives from the expected marginal 
impact of that decision on the organisation's property portfolio. Harding (1991, p. 298) contends that 
"The commitment to redevelopment on the part of owners will also reflect the relative importance 
of particular holdings for the larger interest in question." The more significant property holdings 
become within an organisation's assets, the more likely are properties to be actively managed so as to 
realise overall benefit to the portfolio. On this basis, it is important to set discussion of owner 
networks within the context of owner characteristics and attitudes. After explanation of the research 




The research on which this chapter is based explored the characteristics, attitudes and networks of 
120 owners of vacant urban land or obsolete urban buildings in four British cities. Two of these cities, 
Aberdeen and Nottingham, were selected for investigation because they had witnessed strong  
development pressure in the previous decade, while the other two, Dundee and Stoke-on-Trent, were 
picked because they had experienced weaker development pressure. The choice of two Scottish and 
two English cities was also intended to reflect significant differences in development policies and land 
law north and south of the border. 
 
The research concentrated on the owners of 20 substantial redevelopment sites5 in each city which 
remained undeveloped at 31 December 1995 and which were of at least 2 hectares in area or on which 
at least 5,000m² of gross floorspace was then under active consideration. Although such larger sites 
can make a disproportionate contribution to urban regeneration, they were favoured in the research 
design because, despite notable exceptions, the more significant redevelopment is, in terms of area 
and floorspace, the greater the number of existing owners likely to be affected and the more complex 
the process of negotiation with each one. 
 
Such potential redevelopment sites were identified through discussions with local authorities, 
prominent chartered surveyors, Chambers of Commerce and, in Scotland, local enterprise companies. 
Across the four cities, only 88 sites that fully met the research criteria were discovered by this exercise. 
Random sampling reduced the number for detailed investigation to 80, or 20 in each city. 
 
The research aimed to contact all non-residential owners of freehold or long leasehold (above 99 
years) interests in English sample sites on 31 December 1995, or of corresponding interests in Scottish 
ones, together with those who had owned such interests during the research period of between 1991 
  
 






and 19956. Although many potential owners were identified through local authorities, chartered 
surveyors or informal on-site enquiries, a more comprehensive picture of ownership was obtained 
only through formal searches (at negotiated fees) to the Land Registry in England and Register of 
Sasines in Scotland. 
 
Exhaustive probing and cross-checking of these various sources of information revealed an initial 298 
separate ownership interests in the 80 research sites. However, more detailed investigation, including 
direct contact with potential owners, eliminated 86 of these interests as inapplicable because, for 
example, they either owned the site in question outside the period 1991-95, or owned land beyond 
the site. 
 
Successful contact was made with 140 of the 212 owners in the final research population, representing 
a response rate of 66%. As Table 17.1 reveals, a full research questionnaire was completed for 120 of 
these 140 owners (normally by a member of the research team at interview, although occasionally by 
owners themselves and returned through the post). More limited notes were obtained from the other  
20 owners successfully contacted, usually through telephone conversations but occasionally from 
meetings with a member of the research team. 
 
 
Table 17.1: Owner response rates 
 Aberdeen Dundee Nottingham Stoke Total 
 No % No % No % No % No % 
Successful Contact 
Full questionnaire 29 83 35 48 30 63 26 46 120 57 
Notes from owner  4 11  3  4  7 15  6 11  20  9 
Non Response 
No contact  1  3 28  38  9 19 21 38  59 28 
Refused  1  3   7  10  2  4  3  5  13  6 
Total 35 100 73 100 48 100 56 100 212 100 
 
Only 13 owners openly refused to participate. A further 59 owners proved impossible to contact, 
including 30 who had already relinquished ownership by the end of 1995. Several of these were 
businesses that had previously gone into receivership. Such earlier ownership was particularly 
significant in accounting for the proportionately lower response rate in Stoke-on-Trent. Of the other 
29 owners not contacted, many were small companies in owner-occupation who failed to respond to 
the persistent efforts of the team. This was particularly so in Dundee. 
 
The results presented in this chapter refer to the 120 owners for whom a full research questionnaire 
was completed. Although the research was designed to ensure that owners investigated were 
reasonably representative of those who own interests in large redevelopment sites in British cities, 
there is likely to be some limited bias in the results against smaller companies and private individuals, 
 
6 It should be emphasised that the definition of owners, here adopted for the purposes of the research, does not distinguish 
between those who hold land expressly for the purpose of development and those who do not. We therefore include 






owing to the greater difficulties experienced in successfully contacting them. This should be borne in 




At a rudimentary level, it was possible to divide the 120 owners in two different ways. As Table 17.2 
shows, it is first evident that private-sector owners (72.5% of total) significantly outnumbered public-
sector owners (27.5% of total). This immediate discovery runs counter to the popular and political 
perception that most brownfield land is in public ownership. However, it will be noted that the 87 
private-sector owners identified in Table 17.2 contained 17 privatised PLCs, which included such 
well-known companies as British Coal, British Gas, Powergen and Railtrack. In a sense, then, the 
apparent dominance of the private sector in the ownership of substantial brownfield sites within 
Aberdeen, Dundee, Nottingham and Stoke-on-Trent partly reflects the privatisation of such land 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
 
Table 17.2: Rudimentary owner typology 
  No     % 
Small private-sector owners Private individual/trustee    6  5.0 
 Private company  49 40.8 
Large private-sector owners Always private-sector PLC   15 12.5 
 PLC privatized  17 14.2 
Public-sector owners Government or public body  11   9.2 
 Local authority  22 18.3 
Total  120 100.0 
 
The second rudimentary division apparent from Table 17.2 is that between large and small owners. 
Here a more even split is evident, with larger owners (54.2% of total) just outnumbering smaller ones 
(45.8%). While the research suggested that private individuals and trustees were almost insignificant 
as owners of large brownfield sites, private companies were the single most important owner 
identified. Moreover, as already suggested, private companies may well be under-represented in the 
research analysis, as they were often hard to contact, especially in Dundee. However, the simple 
division of companies into size categories on the basis of whether or not they are registered as PLCs 
is fraught with difficulties. Indeed, as the research showed, some of the private companies investigated 
played quite a substantial role in local, if not national, land and property markets. One private 
developer/dealer operating in Dundee, for example, was instrumental in finding new retail, leisure 
and residential uses for three former industrial sites in the city investigated in the research. 
 
To evaluate whether and how far these 120 owners of vacant urban land or obsolete urban property 
encouraged or impeded redevelopment, detailed information was gathered on their: 
 
• strategies, marketing attempts and site valuations; 
• knowledge of development constraints and any action taken to resolve them; 
• network of contacts; 
• awareness of, and potential influence over broader structural factors; 
• reaction to possible policy changes; 






















 No % No % No % No % No % No % No % 
Significant Encouragement 
 
  12 24.5 4 26.7 1 5.9 1 9.1 4 18.2 22 18 
Encouragement 
 
2 33.3 14 28.6 6 40.0 7 41.2 7 63.6 12 54.5 48 40 
Neutral Impact 
 
2 33.3 17 34.7 5 33.3 4 23.5 1 9.1 4 18.2 33 28 
Discouragement 
 
2 33.3 5 10.2   3 17.6 2 18.2 1 4.5 13 11 
Significant Discouragement 
 
  1 2.0   2 11.8   1 4.5 4 3 
Total 
 






A qualitative analysis was then undertaken, owner by owner, with the results compared, and if 
necessary adjusted, to ensure consistency. Since each redevelopment site is unique, what would most 
encourage redevelopment must vary from site to site. Owners were therefore considered to have 
significantly encouraged redevelopment if, at some time from 1991 to 1995, they had themselves 
sought to resolve at least the most important of the five established tests of development feasibility 
(Barrett et al., 1978) for their particular site7. The distinctiveness of each site ensured that, on one, for 
example, the most significant contribution an owner could make to redevelopment was the fervent 
pursuit of planning permission through recourse to appeal, while on another where planning 
permission was relatively simple to obtain, the owner's energies needed to be concentrated instead on 
securing development grants or subsidies. 
 
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 17.3 by owner type. Overall, the table reveals that 58% 
of the 120 owners analysed encouraged or significantly encouraged redevelopment during the 
research period of 1991 to 1995. A further 28% had a neutral impact on redevelopment and only 14% 
discouraged or significantly discouraged redevelopment. These results are not significantly different 
from those for an extended sample of 155 owners reported in a separate paper (Adams et al., 1999). 
 
What is interesting from Table 17.3 is the differential pattern of owner impact on redevelopment 
prospects between the various owner types. Overall, for example, 73% of public sector owners 
encouraged or significantly encouraged redevelopment in comparison with 53% of those in the 
private sector. Local authorities and other public bodies such as local enterprise companies, were 
usually highly active in pushing redevelopment forward. Within the private sector, combined scores 
for significant encouragement and encouragement were recorded of 67% for PLCs that had always 
been in the private sector, 53% for private companies, 47% for privatised PLCs and only 33% for the 
few trustees/private individuals investigated. 
 
To highlight the overall importance of brownfield sites within ownership portfolios, owners were 
asked to estimate the value of the each site as a proportion of their overall assets and identify the 
number of other potential development they owned within a five mile distance. Those who 
assessed the relative value of the particular site at 5% or less of their total assets accounted for 
two-thirds of the 110 landowners prepared to answer this question. This proportion rose to 80% 
of owners for PLCs that had always been in the private sector and to 100% for both local 
authorities and privatised PLCs. In contrast, it fell to 42% for private companies and to zero for 
private individuals and trustees. However, while all the private individuals and trustees who 
responded to this question valued the particular site at between 6% and 25% of their total assets, 
private companies displayed the most diversified response of any group, with 11% suggesting that 
the particular site was worth 26% to 50% of their total assets and a further 13% reporting that the 
site to be worth more than half of their total assets. 
 
As might be expected, all the local authority respondents owned at least 10 more potential 
redevelopment sites within a five mile distance. Conversely, for all other groups, 80% or more of 
respondents held three or fewer potential redevelopment sites within five mile of the particular 
site investigated in the research. Private individuals and trustees were least likely to hold another 
redevelopment site within this distance. These findings suggest that local authorities, as landowners, 




7 The five tests specified by Barrett et al. (1978) relate to ownership, public procedures, project viability, physical conditions 





In summary, this section demonstrates that, although the private sector (including privatised PLCs) 
dominates the ownership of large brownfield sites, individual private-sector owners have significantly 
less experience of dealing with such sites than local authorities. In addition, public-sector owners as a 
whole appear keener to promote brownfield redevelopment than those in the private sector. 
However, as a general rule within the private-sector, the larger the organisation, the better experienced 
and more well-disposed owners appear to be to redevelopment. 
 
For example, of the PLCs questioned that had always been in the private sector, 54% held at least 2 
other potential redevelopment sites within a five mile distance, 67% encouraged or significantly 
encouraged redevelopment and 90% considered the particular site investigated to be worth 5% or 
less of their asset base. In contrast, the few private individuals and trustees encountered appeared 
more likely to regard the particular site as financially important within their asset base and as a whole, 
to be less encouraging towards redevelopment than the private sector as a whole. Privatised PLCs, 
however, remain an exception to this general rule since they normally had greater experience of 
dealing with brownfield land than the private sector as a whole and held sites that they regarded as 
financially inconsequential in relation to their overall asset base, but were less likely than the average 




To help understand their attitudes towards the broader context for land management and 
development, the 120 brownfield landowners were first asked whether or not it really mattered, 
either to themselves or others, that the particular site owned had not recently been used to its full 
potential. Of the 93 respondent owners, 59% felt that it mattered and 41% that it did not. 
However, this overall response disguised a marked variation between owner types since the 
proportion of respondents who considered that under-use mattered was recorded at 81% for 
public-sector owners, 57% for small private-sector owners and only 46% for large private-sector 
owners. Within the latter category, the figure for privatised PLCs fell to 39%. 
 
Of course, debates on the importance of brownfield land redevelopment are much related to wider 
notions of environmental sustainability and to the appropriate balance between private initiative and 
state intervention in land management and development. The 120 owners were therefore asked to 
state whether they agreed or disagreed with eight "value statements" deliberately constructed to enable 
their attitudes towards these broader matters to be identified. The results are shown in Table 17.4.  
 
As Table 17.4 shows, the value statement recording the highest level of agreement among respondent 
owners (at 94%) was "Customer satisfaction in new development depends very much on the skill and 
flair of the developer." Only four negative responses were recorded to this statement, all from 
privatised PLCs. Otherwise, there was no significant difference in owner responses between public-
sector and private-sector owners. Indeed, public-sector respondents were almost all in agreement with 
this statement, perhaps indicating their lack of confidence in the ability of public policy to assist 
customer satisfaction in new development. 
 
The second highest level of agreement (at 86%) concerned the statement that "Those whose cause 
dereliction should pay for cleaning it up", reflecting the increasingly widespread acceptance of the 
"polluter pays" principle. The highest level of agreement for this statement came from small private-
sectors owners with it securing unanimous support among private individual/trustee respondents and 
virtually unanimous support among private companies. However, the level of support among public-
sector and large-private sector owners fell to 80% and 74% respectively, perhaps indicating their fuller 





Table 17.4: Owner response to attitude statements 
 Agree 
No  
Opinion Disagree Total No Response 
 No % No % No % No %  
          
Customer satisfaction depends on developer 108 94 2 2 5 4 115 100 5 
Those who cause dereliction should pay for it 99 86 4 3 12 10 115 100 5 
Compulsory purchase  should always be regarded as 
last resort 93 80 6 5 17 15 116 100 4 
What happens on private land is of public interest 76 66 14 12 25 22 115 100 5 
State interference on land should be minimal 73 63 6 5 36 31 115 100 5 
No greenfield development while urban land vacant 60 54 10 9 42 38 112 100 8 
Green belts one of  great planning successes 63 54 34 29 19 16 116 100 4 






The statement that "Compulsory purchase should always be regarded as a last resort" received the 
third highest level of agreement among respondents at 80%. There was very little difference between 
public- and private-sector responses to this statement. Even local authority respondents recorded a 
75% rate of support for such limited use of compulsory purchase.  
 
Support levels then started to fall, with the statement that "What happens on private land is a matter 
of legitimate public interest" recording only a 66% level of agreement. Here, however, the statement 
received much stronger levels of support among public-sector respondents (at 81%) than among 
small private-sector ones (at 66%). The least level of support for this statement (at 52%) was found 
among large private-sector respondents, irrespective of whether they had been privatised or not 
 
However, the related statement that "State interference in land management and development should 
be minimal" drew the agreement of 64% among respondents, reflecting the widespread belief among 
brownfield land owners that while state intervention in land management may be legitimate in 
principle, it should in practice be kept to a minimum. The highest level of hostility to state interference 
was recorded among small private-owners, with 73% of the private companies and 83% of the private 
individuals and trustees who responded to the statement supporting the position of minimal state 
intervention. This may well reflect a perception among such smaller private-sector owners that state 
interference is rarely to their advantage. In contrast, support for minimal state intervention fell to 58% 
for public-sector respondents and 50% for those large private-sector ones. 
 
Turning to broader issues of environmental sustainability, the statement that "No development 
should take place on greenfield sites, while there is vacant land within cities" was supported by 54% 
of respondent owners. However, while this outcome was matched exactly by that for large private-
sector respondents, smaller private-sector respondents were even more opposed to greenfield 
development, recording a figure of 63% in support of the statement. In contrast, almost two-thirds 
of public-sector respondents disagreed with the statement, with the figure for local authority 
opposition reaching 70%. This may well reflect the widespread awareness within public decision-
makers that, much as such a policy might prove favourable to public opinion, entire reliance on 
brownfield sites to meet future land demands would be unrealistic. 
 
Overall, the statement that "Green belts have been one of the great successes of postwar British 
planning" generated a similar mixed response. Although the average level of agreement was again 
54%, smaller private-sector respondents (63% in favour of statement) appeared considerably more 
impressed by the success of green belts than larger private-sector respondents (52% in favour) or 
those in the public sector (only 42% in favour). Local authority owners, in particular, appeared 
undecided about the success of green belt policy, with 55% of these respondents having no particular 
opinion on the matter! 
 
Finally, the statement that "Public concern for the environment has gone too far" was widely rejected, 
with only 25% of respondents in favour. However, significant variations in response were recorded 
between owner types. While no central government or public body agreed with this statement, 30% 
of local authority respondents did so. This was exceeded only by private companies (40% in favour) 
and private individuals and trustees (50% in favour). 
 
It is evident from the above analysis that no clear distinction emerged between public and private-
sector owners of brownfield land in their attitudes towards the broader context for land management 
and development. Both appeared to set limits on state intervention in land management and 
development and subscribe instead to notions of owner responsibility and developer initiative. 
Indeed, differences of attitude between large and small private-sector owners were often more 




owners were more "hawkish" than larger private-sectors ones in their support of the "polluter pays" 
principle, in their belief that no development should take place on greenfield sites while there is vacant 
land within cities and in the success they attributed to green belts. In each of these cases, the attitude 
of large private-sector respondents was closer to that of local authorities. 
 
However, the position was reversed in relation to more general public concern for the environment, 
where public-sector and larger private respondents took the more "hawkish" stance. It is perhaps 
ironic that, despite the majority view among all brownfield owners investigated that compulsory 
purchase should be regarded as a last resort and that state interference should be minimal, the 
development prospects of many of the sites investigated were dependent on state support, either 




To discover how extensive were their networks of contacts, the 120 brownfield owners were asked 
to identify the extent and productivity of their contacts with 23 different categories of people and 
organisations. As Table 17.5 shows, a clear distinction emerged in the results between what might be 
considered a close-knit property development network into which the respondents landowners 
appeared well connected and a much broader policy and economic development network in which 
their connections were far looser. 
 
The property development network appeared to comprise seven key contacts, with whom at least half 
of all the respondent brownfield owners had at some stage been in contact. The most frequent link 
proved to be the local planning department, which was contacted by 82% of all respondent owners, 
with 61% describing the contact as productive or highly productive. In most cases, local planning 
authorities are keen to promote brownfield redevelopment and their attitude was therefore likely to 
be viewed favourably by the particular owners interviewed for this research. However, on occasions, 
considerable conflict arose between respondents owners and planning authorities on the perceived 
potential for retail redevelopment, with the authorities seeking to concentrate such development in 
town and city centres against the will of site owners. It is likely that such policies accounted for most 
of the occasions where contact with the planning department was viewed as unfavourable by 
respondent landowners. 
 
Professional consultants formed the next three members of the property development network with 
whom landowners were regularly in contact. Chartered surveyors and property agents play a diverse 
role in the development process, including offering advice on land valuation, marketing, development 
finance, and negotiation on price and rental levels. They were contacted by 74% of all respondent 
owners, with 60% describing the contact as productive or highly productive. 
 
It is perhaps surprising to find that the next most frequently contacted profession by landowners were 
architects or planning consultants but it should be remembered that the research definition of owners 
including property development companies, who would use the services of architects in testing 
development feasibility. Planning consultants provided valuable support for owners in challenging 
unfavourable planning decisions, especially in relation to retail redevelopment. Overall, architects and 
planning consultants were contacted by 65% of all respondent owners, with 57% describing the 





Table 17.5: Extent and Productivity of Owner Contacts 
 Productive Unproductive No Contact Total NR8 
 No % No % No % No %  
Local Planning 
Department 71 61 25 21 21 18 117 100 3 
Chartered 
Surveyors/Property 
Agents 70 60 16 14 31 26 117 100 3 
Architects/Planning 
Consultants 65 57 9 8 41 36 115 100 5 
Lawyers 65 57 8 7 42 37 115 100 5 
Private Com/Ind Dev't 
Companies 49 43 13 11 52 46 114 100 6 
Other Local Authority 
Departments 49 43 18 16 48 42 115 100 5 
Neighbouring 
Landowners 44 38 25 22 46 40 115 100 5 
Private Housebuilding 
Companies 29 25 10 9 75 66 114 100 6 
DOE/Scottish Office 25 22 9 8 80 70 114 100 6 
Local TEC or LEC 22 19 3 3 90 78 115 100 5 
Banks and Building 
Societies 21 18 5 4 88 77 114 100 6 
Housing Associations 16 14 10 9 90 78 116 100 4 
Other Government 
Departments 15 13 4 4 94 83 113 100 7 
English 
Partnerships/Scot 
Enterprise 14 12 7 6 93 82 114 100 6 
Pension Funds and Ins 
Companies 14 12 6 5 94 82 114 100 6 
Local 
Amenity/Environment
al Gps 11 10 6 5 97 85 114 100 6 
Venture Capitalists 7 6 6 5 101 89 114 100 6 
National  
Amenity/Environment
al Gps 5 4 2 2 107 94 114 100 6 
Member of Parliament 3 3 5 4 106 93 114 100 6 
Minister of the Crown 3 3 2 2 109 96 114 100 6 
Conservative Party 2 2 1 1 110 97 113 100 7 
Labour Party 3 3 3 3 108 95 114 100 6 









An almost similar figure was recorded for lawyers who offered important advice to brownfield owners 
in relation to purchase and sale, planning difficulties and increasing on the technicalities of 
contaminated land legislation. Elsewhere in the research, the detrimental impact of ownership 
constraints to urban redevelopment was noted (Adams et al., 1999). In this context, lawyers played an 
important role in clarifying unknown ownership, overcoming partial title and drawing together the 
bundle of ownership rights by ensuring, for example, that any leases and licenses on site were 
effectively terminated. 
 
In this context, it is interesting to note that neighbouring landowners were contacted by 60% of all 
respondent owners, but that only 38% described such contact as productive or highly productive. 
This reflects the problematic nature of boundary disputes and the difficulties often inherent in 
assembling a realistic modern development site from the patchwork quilt of historic ownership within 
an area. In the wider study, it was apparent that such multiple ownership of land, in particular, proved 
hard to resolve without the prospect of lucrative commercial development and/or state intervention.  
 
Other local authority departments, apart from the planning office, were contacted by 58% of all 
respondent owners, with 43% describing the contact as productive or highly productive. It is likely 
that most of these discussions concerned technical issues such as access and drainage that had the 
potential significantly to affect development feasibility. Private industrial and commercial developers 
formed the final group within this close-knit property development network. It is apparent that 
brownfield landowners were in much greater contact with industrial and commercial developers than 
housebuilders (54% as against 34%) and that more respondent owners described contact with the 
former as productive or highly productive than with the latter (43% as against 25%). This probably 
again reflects the perception that retail and office development is likely to be commercially more 
lucrative in brownfield locations than residential development. 
 
All those other people and organisations listed with Table 17.5 who might be considered to form a 
much broader policy and economic development network were contacted by less than half of the 
respondent owners and in most cases by less than a fifth. It is especially noticeable how little direct 
contact existed between large brownfield owners and the political community. However, it may well 
be that such important forms of contact were mediated through the property development network, 
with lawyers and property agents in particular acting as the conduit through which the concerns of 
landowners were drawn to the attention of leading politicians. 
 
Although this possibility was not formally investigated in the research, it became apparent that such 
linkages existed, especially in Nottingham. Here, for example, one of the most influential chartered 
surveyors in the city had been drawn into a wider policy role and now serves alongside leading city 
councillors on the board on a public-private development partnership that is seeking to promote the 
regeneration of the city. If this pattern were to be replicated more widely, it could be argued that 
brownfield owners do not require direct contact with politicians, since their interests are well served 
by indirect contact through their professional representatives. 
 
The research also sought to compare the extent of contact achieved by the different categories of 
owner introduced in the rudimentary typology set out earlier in Table 17.2, with the seven key contacts 
who comprised the property and development network. These were the local planning department, 
chartered surveyors/property agents, architects/planning consultants, lawyers, private commercial 
and industrial companies, other local authority departments and neighbouring landowners. As Table 
17.6 shows, a simple multiplication of the 120 owners by these seven key contacts gave a total number 
of potential contacts of 840. Of course, not all these contacts will need to be made for every 




and its relationship both to public policy and private interests. In the research, 65% of the 840 
potential contacts were made, of which 51% were considered productive and 14% unproductive. 
 
This overall picture masks some interesting contrasts between the six different owner types. As Table 
17.6 clearly shows, larger owners were more frequently in touch with key contacts than smaller 
owners, with the highest level of productive contact enjoyed by the public sector. Indeed, Table 17.6 
would appear to suggest that private companies and individuals were more at the fringes than at the 
centre of these key development networks in urban regeneration. Private individuals and trustees, for 
example, enjoyed less than half the rate of productive contact experienced by government or public 
bodies. In the end, then, a tight nexus of critical contacts in urban redevelopment appears to exist, 
with the richness of that network most intensely experienced by larger, rather than smaller owners. 
 
 










Actual Contacts (%) 
   Productive Unproductive No Contact 
      
Government or 
 public body 11 77 67 11 22 
Local authority 22 154 65 7 28 
Always private-sector PLC 15 105 58 19 23 
PLC privatized 17 119 54 11 35 
Private company 49 343 41 18 41 
Private individual/trustee 6 42 31 14 55 





This chapter has shown that brownfield landowners form an important part of local property 
development networks in which they are most closely linked to local planning departments, chartered 
surveyors/property agents, architects/planning consultants, lawyers, private commercial and 
industrial companies, other local authority departments and their neighbouring landowners. However, 
public-sector owners appear slightly better connected to such networks than large private-sector 
owners and significantly better-connected that small private-sectors owners. 
 
These results are relevant in assessing the robustness of growth coalitions and associated networks 
within the context of selected cities in the United Kingdom. From its inception out of experience in 
the United States, the concept of growth coalition emphasises the efforts of landowners in 
contributing to local economic growth. However, there appears to be significant differences between 
the balance of land ownership interests in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
In the United Kingdom out of historical coincidence and political influence, public sector ownership 
interests are more dominant than in the United States where the private sector interests are the key 
players. The research results indicate that public sector interests are more critical to redevelopment 




redevelopment land in their areas, the research suggests that they have recently maintained 
significantly encouragement towards redevelopment. Harding (1991) contends that growth coalitions 
take different forms, but retain their substance. The research findings suggest possible coalition-
building around public sector interests. The objective is consistently the achievement of local 
economic regeneration. 
 
Although, growth coalitions stand to benefit from inward investment, it may be the case that some 
coalitions with limited local development capacity will have to wait for their turn in attracting mobile 
capital. However, the onus is on such local interests to create and maintain a necessary atmosphere 
through stable political and social systems in order that inward investment will reach them sooner 
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